Someone is Threatening the Elections. But Who?
Czech Elections: Last-Minute Campaign Against Fake TikTok Accounts Lacks Evidence and Transparency
Note from “Francezul”: this guest post is a translation of an article published by Cecílie Jílková in Czech.
“Russia is threatening elections in one European country after another,” claims the European Commission. Fake accounts on TikTok allegedly spread pro-Russian content virally, manipulating citizens’ free will, say mainstream media. Therefore, before elections, greater control and censorship of platforms is necessary—but even that is not enough. In some cases, according to Thierry Breton, it is even necessary to cancel elections or prevent certain candidates from running.
The TikTok Case
“Czech authorities are intensively investigating a network of hundreds of interconnected accounts on the social network TikTok, which appear to be attempting to interfere in the elections in favor of anti-system parties,” Deník N wrote three days ago. “We describe how the network delivers anti-system content to hundreds of thousands of users, what policies it promotes, and what indicates that the operation has ties to Russia,” the article continues.
According to Deník N, this is essentially a “bot” network that operates partly automatically and promotes content of SPD and “Stačilo!”. According to the paper, Czech authorities, including intelligence services, are now investigating the case. I decided to investigate as well, for Public News, the American platform of investigative journalist Michael Shellenberger.
“We contacted TikTok and the European Commission. We will wait to see how TikTok assesses the complaint and what measures it will take,” the Czech Telecommunication Office (ČTÚ) told me. “Investigation and enforcement of DSA obligations toward TikTok as a very large platform, however, fall within the competence of the European Commission.”
ČTÚ was designated by the Czech government as the Digital Coordinator under the DSA legislation, and so far it has been doing its job fairly and correctly.
Romania as “Inspiration” for the Rest of Europe
The main argument of BIS (Czech intelligence) and the media as to why we should fear pro-Russian TikTok accounts is what happened last year in Romania. Yet BIS and the media do not mention that Romanian intelligence services did not provide evidence in their reports of Russian financing of TikTok influencers. Journalist Stéphane Luçon, living in Romania, also pointed out to me that some of those TikTok influencers were financed by the ruling party—which the party itself admitted. Nevertheless, the Romanian scenario is relevant for the Czech Republic, albeit for different reasons.
A few weeks ago, Romanian Interior Minister and Deputy Prime Minister Cătălin Predoiu—who held the same post when the Romanian elections were cancelled—said on TV that intelligence services across the Western world were analyzing the Romanian case as something admirable.
“I believe that what happened last year in Romania is currently being studied by all intelligence services in the Western world. Conclusions are being drawn, and countries are adopting defensive measures inspired by how Romania defended itself,” he said, adding that his Czech counterpart, whom he called a good friend, told him: “We also have elections this autumn and we are watching very closely what happened in your country.”
Vít Rakušan has indeed recently met with the Romanian Interior Minister at several events. During the turbulent pre-election period he was criticized by the opposition for supporting the Chat Control legislation, the Dozimetr scandal resurfaced, and journalist Markéta Dobiášová even uncovered the first pieces of a case alleging Russian financing of Rakušan’s party. The idea that the weekend elections are partly in the hands of this man may frighten many Czech voters.
Operation “Elections 2025”
The unrest before the elections may also have been caused by reports that a specialized army group was misused by actors from military circles to monitor the opposition using specialized Gerulata software and to compile lists of potentially undesirable persons. MP Pavel Růžička (ANO) claims to have received records from insiders.
According to leaked documents, the army documented “the opinions and attitudes of these people towards the activities of the Ministry of Defence, its leaders, senior Czech army officials, and the war in Ukraine.”
General Karel Řehka later argued that the data collection and surveillance of the opposition were merely a military exercise in case someone attempted to interfere in the elections.
The “Russian Campaign” as a Universal Pretext
After President Trump took office, a Czech internal security director at the Ministry of the Interior declared that the USA was the most dangerous country in the world for the Czech Republic—right after Russia, China, and Iran—and that Russia recruits influence agents in the Czech Republic without their knowledge.
The narrative “you are all Putin’s agents” appeared in the Czech Republic about a year ago when The New York Times published an article summarizing various incidents in Europe over the past decade later identified by US and allied intelligence services as part of a Russian campaign.
After Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, a digital “Iron Curtain” was established between the Czech Republic and Russia, preventing Czechs from accessing Russian state websites. That is a pity. Czechs thus cannot read, for example, how Putin’s Russia is introducing Chat Control, digital IDs, and a CBDC ruble—unless some Czech outlet like Reportéři on-line relays it to them, which we have tried to do for three years.
According to the latest polls, Czechs still prefer public service media when it comes to Ukraine, while alternative media have little relevance on this topic, and Russian media practically interest no one.
It is therefore somewhat surprising that the Voxpot website recently published a list of websites that repost content from Russian state platforms, arguing that this is a Russian campaign and perhaps even a violation of sanctions. Russia’s funding of these websites has never been proven, and merely linking to a sanctioned website or reposting an article from a sanctioned website does not constitute a violation of sanctions.
The GLOBSEC think tank, which has several large arms manufacturers among its sponsors companies, including Lockheed Martin, KNDS, and Saab, warned about the risks of Russian influence. In collaboration with the British Institute for Strategic Dialogue and CEDMO (Central European Digital Media Observatory), it prepared an analysis entitled “Czechia: Country Election Risk Assessment.”
Thus, the mechanism of ostracizing the opposition in the Czech Republic seems to operate with the universal mantra: Russian campaign. Intelligence services, initiatives, or NGOs present allegations, media uncritically repeat them, and governments or courts can then use them to justify extraordinary measures. But when asked where the evidence is—no one looks for an answer.
I’ve written it several times before, but I’ll write it again: one should not silently agree with something just because it is somewhat or even highly probable. At least some journalists should ask where the evidence is—simply because that is their job. And also because in history we’ve already had situations where intelligence services did not tell the truth. If only someone would explain that to Deník N.
The European Union Takes Over USAID’s Role
Journalist Lee Fang, in his article on the cancellation of the Romanian elections, stated that the Romanian Center for Independent Journalism was sponsored by USAID. USAID also sponsored Freedom House Romania, Aspen Institute Romania, and the Balkan Investigative Reporting Network Romania.
A similar model existed in the Czech Republic before USAID was abolished. According to analyst Natálie Vachatová from the Czech Free Speech Defense Society, USAID in the Czech Republic primarily funded projects focused on “supporting civil society, independent media, and educational activities with the aim of strengthening the principles of openness, government accountability, and human rights.”
USAID has a long history of scandals and controversies and has repeatedly been identified as cover for CIA activities. After USAID’s closure, some organizations ceased operations, others turned to the public for support, and others continued to receive funding from EU funds.
That is the case with the investigative journalism organization OCCRP, which, according to German television, was funded by USAID and INL. OCCRP’s partners in the Czech Republic include Seznam and Investigace.cz. One of Investigace’s editors is Josef Šlerka, who is also part of the newly established Center for Online Risk Research. The current Czech case of fake TikTok accounts stems from this initiative’s work.
“We are not an organization, but an initiative of ordinary citizens,” explained Vendula Prokůpková—quoted by Deník N in all its articles on the TikTok case—to me over the phone.
Prokůpková told me that her recently founded initiative, which lists only two members on its website, uses the R programming language to compile lists of fake accounts on TikTok. These lists are then sent to the Czech Telecommunications Office via a public portal. The second member of the initiative is the aforementioned Josef Šlerka, who has ties to NED and OCCRP through his projects.
The same Josef Šlerka, together with the director of the Czech intelligence agency (BIS), trained members of the Chamber of Deputies in January about the threat of Russian influence on elections, presenting the network of TikTok accounts in Romania as an example.
The commission is vague and silent
Since the activation of the EU Rapid Response System in Czechia took place quietly and completely unnoticed by the press and the public, I approached a representative of the European Commission at the CEDMO conference in Prague with a question about which organizations have a mandate from the Commission to label pre-election content on social networks.
The answer given by Krisztina Stumpová, who participated in the creation of the Code of Practice on Disinformation, was a textbook example of how to talk for a long time and say nothing at all. Even representatives of Seznam and Demagog were more forthcoming.
“We are part of a rapid response system established by the European Commission. There are other organizations, but this question must be answered by the European Commission. [...] I believe that the decision not to disclose the names of the organizations is intentional in order to protect the integrity of these organizations,” said Jan Fridrichovský from Demagog.
I also contacted the European Commission about the TikTok case. However, apart from information that a pre-election meeting of platforms, the Commission, and the Czech Telecommunications Office (ČTÚ) had recently taken place with a focus on preventing election interference, I again learned nothing. Why is TikTok not monitored by any official organization in the Czech Republic? Why are the elections “left to the mercy” of Mr. Šlerka’s volunteer initiative? No answer.
TikTok is trying, but will it be enough?
Other actors also responded to my questions only partially or not at all. Josef Šlerka received about two dozen questions about the financing and functioning of his new initiative, its methodology, and his ties to OCCRP and BIS. He did not answer a single question. If his initiative is acting in accordance with the DSA, then it should read this legislation. The DSA may be a terrible regulation, but at least it obliges actors to be transparent. Perhaps that is why Mr. Šlerka’s initiative is just an initiative and not an organization. Is he trying to avoid this transparency?
TikTok responded to my questions with a general statement: “Before the elections in Czechia, we proactively implemented additional security measures, including an election center in the app that provides access to verified election information. We continue to actively combat fraudulent behavior, and since the beginning of August, we have blocked and removed millions of fake likes and follow requests in Czechia.”
I also contacted the authors of the articles in Deník N. I was particularly interested in finding out where they had learned about the conclusions of Mr Šlerka’s initiative. “I cannot answer that on principle, we always protect our sources,” replied Lukáš Prchal.
Meanwhile, the content of the article about fake accounts on TikTok has been picked up by all major Czech media outlets and some foreign ones, including Reuters. The headlines are misleading in some cases, and in many cases downright fabricated. “According to research, TikTok functions as a breeding ground for Kremlin propaganda in our country as well” (Novinky). “Three days until the election: Russia wants to influence the election by sowing distrust. President Pavel knows how to counter this” (Fórum24).
Josefa Šlerka’s colleague, Vendula Prokůpková, tried to explain two things to me on the phone: 1 - We don’t know who is paying for these pro-Russian bot accounts. We have no tools to find out. 2 - We never said that these TikTok accounts lead to Russia.
Meanwhile, oversight of Meta, TikTok, and X continues, with special attention to prevent pro-Russian propaganda from going viral through troll farms. Unfortunately, as before the Romanian elections, this also limits legitimate reach of ordinary authentic citizens and journalists. We saw it ourselves yesterday when sharing of our own investigation was suspended on X with a warning that X is protecting users from spam.
There is nothing left but to closely watch the elections and what happens afterward.
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