The good news: ANCOM has finally forwarded my Article 53 complaint about journalist censorship to Ireland’s Digital Services Coordinator. The bad news: it took two and a half months, multiple follow-ups, and what could be deliberate stalling on the TikTok portion—the platform where censorship of Romanian journalists is most severe.
Article 53: The Right They Don’t Want You to Use?
Before we dive in, let’s be clear about what this complaint mechanism actually is. Article 53 of the Digital Services Act gives every EU citizen a fundamental right:
Recipients of the service and any body, organisation or association mandated to exercise the rights conferred by this Regulation on their behalf shall have the right to lodge a complaint against providers of intermediary services alleging an infringement of this Regulation with the Digital Services Coordinator of the Member State where the recipient of the service is located or established.
The Digital Services Coordinator shall assess the complaint and, where appropriate, transmit it to the Digital Services Coordinator of establishment, accompanied, where considered appropriate, by an opinion.
In plain language: if a platform violates the DSA, you can complain to your national coordinator, who must forward it to the coordinator overseeing that platform (usually in Ireland). Simple, right?
In practice, as you’re about to see, Romania’s ANCOM has turned this straightforward process into an obstacle course.
The Background: A Censorship Crisis No One Wants to Acknowledge
As we documented in our comprehensive investigation, after two months without meaningful progress, I filed a formal Article 53 complaint pointing to systematic censorship of journalists and independent voices on Facebook, TikTok, and X.
Not because these platforms were necessarily the ones making all the censorship decisions, but because they are the only actors the DSA allows users to confront directly.
The complaint also tries to force answers to the most basic due-process questions: Who made the call? When? On what grounds? At whose request? Why was a post removed—or an entire account deleted?
It is also meant to get ANCOM to address the systemic risk represented by a moderation architecture targeting critical voices—one that appears to serve the interests of Romania’s executive power, or portions of it.
Indeed, many of the takedowns appear to stem from politically motivated flagging campaigns that could possibly be coordinated with Romania’s executive branch. The complaint was always intended to escalate to Ireland’s Coimisiún na Meán (CnaM), which supervises most major platforms in Europe—that is, if ANCOM properly forwarded it, as required under the DSA.
The DSA promised meaningful recourse through internal appeals and out-of-court settlement bodies. In practice, platforms appear to reject appeals almost automatically. Out-of-court settlement bodies are out of reach for regular Romanian users and are often unresponsive even when contacted.
The Stalling Game: Two Months of Bureaucratic Obstruction
When I first filed this complaint two and a half months ago, ANCOM’s response was... creative. Their restrictive interpretation of Article 53 was to block complaints about systematic discrimination. In a written response, it argued that a journalist could not submit other journalists’ censorship cases as evidence of systemic risk—a position another Digital Services Coordinator has confirmed is incorrect. We have been waiting for almost a month for ANCOM to acknowledge this error and escalate the complaint to the actually responsible coordinator, Coimisiún na Meán (CnaM) in Ireland.
But although they forwarded the Facebook and X portions two weeks ago, they suddenly needed “additional information” about the TikTok account.
This was transparently absurd for several reasons:
First, all necessary information had been provided initially. The TikTok account ownership was sufficiently documented, screenshots were attached, the timeline was clear.
Second, and most importantly, TikTok is where the censorship problem is most acute in Romania right now. As I noted in a recent article, there are massive red flags around TikTok’s moderation practices, including the involvement of Teleperformance, a French company handling outsourced moderation with questionable practices. While I was still waiting for ANCOM’s latest response, TikTok took down additional content from Romanian journalists.
The pattern was concerning: delay, minimize, avoid addressing the systemic issues at all costs.
Progress, But Questions Remain
I’ve now received formal confirmation that ANCOM has escalated the complaint to Coimisiún na Meán in Ireland. This is genuinely good news.
But there’s a catch: I still don’t know exactly what ANCOM sent.
This matters enormously. So by making my complaint public here, I’m creating a record that allows anyone at the Irish DSC investigating this matter to identify discrepancies. Specifically, I’m not entirely certain that ANCOM properly warned CnaM that they should examine the series of journalist accounts being censored as evidence of systemic risk.
The distinction is crucial. My complaint isn’t just about my individual accounts being censored—though that alone would violate Articles 14, 16, 17, and 20 of the DSA. It’s about a pattern of systematic targeting of independent journalists that suggests coordinated abuse of the moderation architecture.
The complaint is comprehensive, referencing previous correspondence with ANCOM and documenting multiple instances of abusive moderation. It directly confronts the systemic risk that must be assessed:
If ANCOM fails to enforce the DSA, to supervise the actors involved in it—may they be Trusted Flaggers, members of the Rapid Response System, or other participants in the moderation architecture (Fact-Checkers, moderators within the VLOPs or outsourced, Monitoring Reporters, National Audiovisual Council, and even Intelligence Services)—if ANCOM fails to trigger investigations when major independent journalists or outlets are censored, the risk is a perverted implementation of the DSA, where censorship strikes without accountability, where transparency isn’t achieved, users are not properly informed, appeal and redress are impossible, and the executive power benefits from, and uses, a whole architecture to ensure control of the information flow to its advantage.
The systemic risk here is the abuse of the DSA by the executive power to avoid being challenged by independent journalists.
As an illustration to understand why this risk is so concerning, I’d like to underline that The Economist Intelligence Unit downgraded Romania, in the 2024 Democracy Index, from “Flawed Democracy”, to “Hybrid Regime”. Beside lawfare and other abuses by the authorities, the censorship and propaganda mechanisms are one of the obvious places where a country in democratic regress would show profound flaws. The issue is the way the DSA–arguably a tool for transparency and the defence of users–can be hijacked, in a country where democratic norms are weakened, for the benefit of the executive power.
What Happens Next
The complaint is now in Ireland’s hands. Coimisiún na Meán must assess whether platforms have violated the DSA through inadequate statements of reasons, failure to provide effective internal appeals, discriminatory enforcement of community standards, and systematic violations of users’ rights.
They should also determine whether ANCOM’s restrictive interpretation of Article 53 is correct—or whether, as I argue, systematic discrimination claims necessarily require examining patterns across multiple users and platforms.
Hopefully, they will also shed light on one of the most important questions of the investigation, the one that got 0 (zero) answers so far: who did the censorship? Is there an identifiable bad actor within the Romanian moderation architecture?
The stakes extend beyond my individual case. If platforms can systematically censor journalists with impunity, hiding behind opaque moderation processes and unaccountable flagging mechanisms, the DSA’s fundamental rights protections become meaningless.
If Coimisiún na Meán takes these concerns seriously, it could mark a turning point for platform accountability in the EU. If it doesn’t, the DSA risks becoming a tool of soft authoritarianism rather than a shield for user rights.
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The Complaint
August 27, 2025, 10:40 AM
Subject: Re: SC-16190/01.08.2025 - Response to Request for Additional Evidence
Dear Ms. Dragomir,
Thank you for your response.
I am concerned that, nearly one month after my initial complaint and three months since my colleague Cecilie Jilkova’s first inquiry, ANCOM has not yet forwarded this matter to Coimisiún na Meán.
This delay, combined with a restrictive interpretation of Article 53, risks undermining my rights under the DSA and enabling systemic issues, such as a continuous misuse of moderation processes to limit journalistic expression, while bypassing transparency, appeal, and redress obligations.
Nevertheless, I thank you for confirming my complaint will be forwarded to Coimisiún na Meán and that I will be informed when this happens. Considering ANCOM’s obligation to cooperate swiftly with Coimisiún na Meán, I respectfully request confirmation that this complaint will be transmitted without further delay.
I. Article 53
We have diverging interpretations on Article 53. I’m looking forward to understanding if Coimisiún na Meán has the same interpretation.
I exposed the major issues raised by this restrictive interpretation in my last message but will repeat them again here:
1. Article 53’s Actual Text
Article 53 allows complaints about breaches “by the provider of the service” - it does not limit this to breaches affecting only the individual complainant. When a platform, directly or upon request of actors from the current moderation architecture, implements systematic enforcement policies that discriminate against journalists, this constitutes a breach of their service obligations under the DSA that affects all users in that category.
Such an interpretation would shield systemic discrimination from individual challenges, effectively undermining the DSA’s protections for fundamental rights and contradicting the regulation’s core purpose of ensuring “safe, predictable and trusted online environment” for all users.
2. Systematic Discrimination Creates Direct Impact
When platforms systematically target journalists, this creates a discriminatory environment that directly affects my rights as a journalist. You cannot separate “how they treated others” from “how they will treat me” when there is a clear pattern of bias against my professional category. The systematic targeting establishes a hostile environment that chills my own journalistic expression.
3. Evidence Standard for Discrimination Claims
The cases I referenced are not separate complaints about “other recipients” - they constitute essential evidence of systematic enforcement patterns that directly impact my treatment. If ANCOM’s interpretation were upheld, it would make it impossible for any complainant to prove discriminatory or politically motivated enforcement, as doing so necessarily requires comparing treatment across similar users.
4. DSA’s Systemic Risk Framework Requires Pattern Analysis
Articles 34-35 mandate that VLOPs assess and mitigate systemic risks to fundamental rights. ANCOM’s restrictive reading would make these provisions meaningless - no individual could ever complain about systematic violations because they could only reference their own isolated case. This cannot be the correct interpretation of a regulation specifically designed to address systemic online harms.
5. Chilling Effect Doctrine
In established media law principles, systematic targeting of journalists creates a recognized “chilling effect” that impacts ALL journalists’ willingness to publish critical content. This is a direct harm that affects me professionally even before my specific content is targeted. The DSA’s fundamental rights protections must account for this well-established legal doctrine.
II. Articles 34 and 35
I believe the list of instances of journalists abusively censored, without proper explanation, chances of appeal, or possibility of obtaining redress is telling enough.
Meanwhile, while I was expecting proper handling of the question asked, three more concerning instances of abusive moderation have happened: Robert Turcescu’s TikTok account has been suspended, Vlad Mercori’s TikTok account suffers a powerful shadow-ban with -80% traffic, Pr Paul Dragos Aligica’s Facebook account as been put on restricted status.
Please find hereunder the updated list of instances:
Mr. Ion Cristoiu – TikTok account suspended on April 9, 2025.
Robert Turcescu – TikTok video from May 6, 2025, discussing “Operation NDP”, an alleged manipulation strategy.
Robert Turcescu – TikTok video from April 14, 2025, discussing the U.S. delegation’s role in verifying Romania’s electoral process.
Robert Turcescu – (new instance since my first complaint message) TikTok account suspended on July 24, 2025
Marius Tucă – Editorial from March 14, 2025, commenting on the alleged “Coup d’État”, flagged by CNA; Tucă self-censored later on to protect his accounts.
Marius Tucă – Two Facebook posts from May 28, 2025, removed consecutively for seemingly including the name/image of Mr. Durov, despite the same article later being accepted after edits of metadata.
Marius Tucă – TikTok videos removed on three separate dates: February 21, March 25, and April 16, 2025.
Le Monde diplomatique – ediția română – Facebook page blocked from posting since March 2024, now fully removed from the manager’s interface (Stéphane Luçon’s account).
Stéphane Luçon – X (Twitter) account (handle: @sfglucon) suspended within minutes of sharing a link to a key excerpt of the President-elect’s interview on B1 TV (May 21, 2025) where he acknowledged that his opponent “wouldn’t have taken the country out of the EU nor NATO, but would have blocked support for Ukraine and Moldova”.
Le Monde diplomatique – ediția română - TikTok account drastically shadow banned after sharing a screenshot of a translated article written by Le Monde diplomatique’s Deputy Director and specialist in international institutions Anne-Cécile Robert on May 28, 2024, named “Curtea Internațională de Justiție identifică un risc plauzibil de genocid în Gaza” (The International Court of Justice identifies a plausible risk of genocide in Gaza.)
Andrei Murgescu – Satirical Facebook post from May 20, 2025, demoted after being fact-checked as “false” despite containing an accurate photo of President-elect Mr. Dan.
1776 Podcast – Facebook post from May 11, 2023, fact-checked as “missing context” despite linking to a full debate, contextually framed.
Victor Roncea – Personal and ActiveNews Facebook accounts threatened with suspension (May 18, 2025) for reusing a stock AP/Alamy photo, flagged as “child nudity and sexual exploitation of children,” while the same image remains publicly available on the platform.
Vlad Mercori - (new instance since my first complaint message) TikTok account suffering an 80% drop in traffic after covering an overpricing scandal involving electric school minibus procurement in Bihor County during Ilie Bolojan’s tenure as county president (now Prime Minister), a matter that involves potential misuse of European funds.
Professor Paul Dragos Aligica - (new instance since my first complaint message) Facebook account on “restricted” status since undetermined date, identified as such on August 25, 2025; restrictions based on a post and picture already removed by Facebook in March 2020 and April 2023, with no clear “rule” broken by the post and picture, no resolution path available. Although not another journalist case, Professor Aligica, Professor of Governance at University of Bucharest, Senior Research Fellow at George Mason University, Senior Nonresident Scholar, Center for Governance and Markets, Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Pittsburgh and Member of the Romanian Academy as well as The Academy of Europe - Academia Europaea, with books published by Oxford and Cambridge University Presses, is a critical voice in Romanian mass media, a comentator regularly publishing detailed analyses on governance, information flow and freedom of expression on his Facebook account.
I will not explain the obvious regarding all those voices from the press—voices that are all non-aligned, independent, not working in major Romanian outlets financed by public money.
But I will seize the opportunity to clarify the Systemic Risk at play, a risk that would justify escalating the matter to the European Commission.
If ANCOM fails to enforce the DSA, to supervise the actors involved in it—may they be Trusted Flaggers, members of the Rapid Response System, or other participants in the moderation architecture (Fact-Checkers, moderators within the VLOPs or outsourced, Monitoring Reporters, National Audiovisual Council, and even Intelligence Services)—if ANCOM fails to trigger investigations when major independent journalists or outlets are censored, the risk is a perverted implementation of the DSA, where censorship strikes without accountability, where transparency isn’t achieved, users are not properly informed, appeal and redress are impossible, and the executive power benefits from, and uses, a whole architecture to ensure control of the information flow to its advantage.
The systemic risk here is the abuse of the DSA by the executive power to avoid being challenged by independent journalists.
As an illustration to understand why this risk is so concerning, I’d like to underline that The Economist Intelligence Unit downgraded Romania, in the 2024 Democracy Index, from “Flawed Democracy”, to “Hybrid Regime”. Beside lawfare and other abuses by the authorities, the censorship and propaganda mechanisms are one of the obvious places where a country in democratic regress would show profound flaws. The issue is the way the DSA–arguably a tool for transparency and the defence of users–can be hijacked, in a country where democratic norms are weakened, for the benefit of the executive power.
I expect this risk to be properly assessed by Coimisiún na Meán and by the European Commission, and, if necessary, the role of ANCOM as Digital Service Coordinator to be put under scrutiny so that independence of the Romanian Digital Services Coordinator from the executive power is achieved, transparency and redress mechanisms are actually enforced, and, ideally, core articles of Romania’s constitution are even respected—especially article 30 regarding “Freedom of Expression” and article 31 regarding “Right to Information”.
III. Specific Censorship Instances Involving My Accounts
I appreciate that ANCOM has acknowledged its Article 53 obligations to assess this complaint and forward it to the Irish Digital Services Coordinator “accompanied, where deemed necessary, by a reasoned opinion.” In order to facilitate ANCOM’s fulfillment of these obligations, I am providing below the detailed information and legal basis for each claim:
1. Le Monde diplomatique – ediția română (Facebook page)
Breaches: Articles 14, 16, 17, 20
Page blocked since March 2024, then removed entirely from the manager interface in 2025
No adequate statement of reasons provided
No matching entry in the DSA statement database (please provide the relevant statement number)
No effective internal appeal mechanism
Discriminatory enforcement of community standards
2. Personal X (Twitter) Account Suspension – @sfglucon
Breaches: Articles 14, 16, 17, 20
Suspended minutes after sharing legitimate journalistic content (President-elect interview, May 21, 2025)
Suspension involved human moderation
False justification and no matching entry in DSA statement database (please provide statement number)
No effective redress mechanism
3. Le Monde diplomatique – ediția română (TikTok post)
Breaches: Articles 14, 16, 17, 20
Posts shadow-banned after May 28, 2024, with zero views
No adequate statement of reasons provided
No matching entry in the DSA statement database (please provide the relevant statement number)
No effective internal appeal mechanism
Discriminatory enforcement of community standards
Supporting Evidence Available
I am providing in annex screenshots and emails received from the VLOPs–when applicable–regarding the instances concerning accounts I personally manage.
Conclusion
I acknowledge our diverging interpretation of Article 53. Should Coimisiún na Meán stand by my interpretation, allowing complaints concerning rights violations affecting other recipients, I will then submit additional documentation exposing those cases.
I previously requested that ANCOM:
Conduct a full assessment of the breaches affecting my accounts
Issue a reasoned opinion on the systematic enforcement patterns affecting Romanian users
Transmit this complaint to the Irish DSC, along with ANCOM’s findings
Request relevant moderation data from platforms regarding Romanian user accounts
Considering this complaint will now be transmitted to Coimisiún na Meán—one month after I first submitted it, and nearly three months since the initial list of censorship instances was communicated to ANCOM via the inquiries submitted by my colleague Cecilie Jilkova—I now formally ask for your assistance in requesting that Coimisiún na Meán:
Provides a clear timeline for their assessment;
Conducts a full assessment of the breaches affecting my accounts;
Issues a reasoned opinion on the systematic enforcement patterns affecting Romanian users, with particular attention to Romanian and Romania-based journalists;
Requests relevant moderation data from platforms regarding Romanian user accounts;
Obtains the corresponding statements of reason for each instance affecting my account and, should Coimisiún na Meán confirm that Article 53 covers complaints concerning other journalists, for each of the additional cases listed here;
Delivers a detailed description of the moderation processes for each case, including specifically identifying the actors who initially flagged the content, those who decided to moderate it, and, where available, those who reviewed the appeals.
Considering the urgency of protecting media freedom and the critical importance of enforcing the DSA, I expect confirmation of the transmission of this complaint to Coimisiún na Meán within 7 days.
Best regards,
Stéphane Luçon
Journalist, DSA Article 53 Complainant
Annex 1: Le Monde diplomatique – ediția română
Facebook page suspension (Facebook ID: 61556409187698:2048)
A post from April 2024 about the status of the page:
Later status of the page:
As per June 1, 2025, the page had totally disappeared from my account (personal account handle: stephanelucon).
Annex 2: personal X account suspension
(X ID: @sfglucon)
Account suspension on May 21, 2024:
Appeal accepted after a lawyer personally interceded to X team:
Request for information sent after my account was reinstated (no answer received so far):
Annex 3: Le Monde diplomatique – ediția română
TikTok Account drastically deamplified (TikTok ID: @diploromania)
Initial situation when observed, with annotations:
The situation has been reported on X, on May 29, 2024, with a tag to a TikTok account, @tiktokcreators:
Situation as per today.
You can see the duration of the shadow-ban until the account seems to have retrieved a form of normal visibility, after submitting a support request (no trace of it) and posting on X.
